1. Parum prodest sibi ius proprietatis tribuere, nisi actus iuridicus ponatur quo praescriptio interrumpitur. Nam possessio e iusta causa seu titulo derivata et continua interrumpitur per actum iuridicum v.g. citationem, quo quis dominium suum repetat aut quomodocumque ius possessoris in dubium vocet.
2. Quoties decisio administrativa non fuit impugnata intra terminos a lege praescriptos, et administratus, ut iterum ingrediatur terminos quos infructuose decurrere permiserit, petitionem exhibet Auctoritati administrativae, et haec eam simpliciter reiciit hac sola de causa, quod rei iam ante a provisum fuerat, huiusmodi pronuntiatio, simpliciter declarans controversiam iam fuisse decisam, non est iuridice impugnabilis.
E contra quoties Auctoritas administrativa, cum impugnatam videat suam decisionem, processum aperiat, qui perveniat ad alterum decretum, hoc decretum etsi confirmativum, est «un provvedimento nuovo», igitur impugnabile (in casu recurrens post prius decretum competentis Curiae Romanae Dicasterii haud iners fuit, nam ad Summum Pontificem recurrit, cuius voluntate petitio remissa est ad idem Dicasterium, quia argumenta adducta «non sembrerebbero immeritevoli» considerationis. Quod Dicasterium «esaminate le ragioni esposte contro la nota risoluzione» rationeque habita «delle recenti precisazioni», pervenit ad edendum decretum quod, licet vocari possit confirmativum, prout cum praecedente congruit, novum definit tamen processum administrativum).
| 1. It avails little to claim for oneself the right of ownership unless a juridical act is placed by which prescription is interrupted. For possession derived from a just cause or title, and continuous, is interrupted by a juridical act — for example, a citation — by which one reclaims his ownership or in any way calls the right of the possessor into question.
2. Whenever an administrative decision has not been impugned within the time limits prescribed by law, and the interested party, in order to re-enter the time limits which he has fruitlessly allowed to run out, presents a petition to the administrative Authority, and the latter simply rejects it on the sole ground that provision had already been made in the matter, a pronouncement of this kind, simply declaring that the controversy has already been decided, is not juridically impugnable.
On the contrary, whenever the administrative Authority, seeing its decision impugned, opens a process which leads to a second decree, this decree, even if confirmatory, is «un provvedimento nuovo» (a new measure), and therefore impugnable (in the case at hand the one making recourse was by no means inactive after the first decree of the competent Dicastery of the Roman Curia, for he had recourse to the Supreme Pontiff, by whose will the petition was remitted to the same Dicastery, since the arguments adduced «non sembrerebbero immeritevoli» ("would not seem undeserving") of consideration. That Dicastery, «esaminate le ragioni esposte contro la nota risoluzione» ("having examined the reasons set forth against the resolution in question") and having taken account «delle recenti precisazioni» ("of the recent clarifications"), came to issue a decree which, although it may be called confirmatory insofar as it agrees with the preceding one, nevertheless concludes a new administrative process). |
