1. Grave adest discrimen, quoad peremptionem instantiae, inter actorem, qui tribunal adit ad sua iura vindicanda, et recurrentem contra actum Auctoritatis ecclesiasticae. Sane, relate ad priorem, viget principium quod privatum interesse eum sollicitum reddere debeat: quodsi ignavus manserit, sibi imputet. Tantummodo ne lites apertae in indefinitum tempus maneant ius statuit terminos sat latos peremptionis. Status rerum omnino diversus habetur quando impetitur actus administrativus, qui tangit vitam et ordinem communitatis.
2. Ita bene intelligitur quomodo Normae Speciales exigant ut normae generales de processibus ita accomodentur «ut quam maxime consulatur illi brevitati, quam praeseferre debent processus celebrandi coram Sectione altera Signaturae Apostolicae» (art. 120), atque Cardinali Praefecto necnon Secretario facultatem conferant «terminos fatales» constituendi (cf. art. 102, § 2). In quo processu applicatur quoque illa dispositio generalis cuiuscumque iuris processualis, iuxta quam qui citatoriam schedam recipere recuset, legitime citatus habeatur (in casu recurrens deliberate usus est systhemate non acceptandi intimationes Signaturae Apostolicae, quoad patronum sibi constituendi et cautionem solvendam, conscius se tali machinatione posse impedire decisionem; qua de re recursus desertus declaratur).
3. Ad hoc ut recursus contentiosus administrativus efficaciam sortiatur, debet referre rationes quibus nititur, leges quae violatae asseruntur et conclusiones. Et quidem merito, quia recursus his elementis carens, inutilis evadit quia indagatio circa illegitimitatem decreti non potest peragi ex officio (in casu recursus ipse haud completus est in elementis essentialibus; nam nullo modo indicat quaenam sint leges violatae in decreto amotionis).
| 1. There is a serious difference, as regards the peremption of the instance, between the petitioner, who approaches a tribunal to vindicate his own rights, and the one making recourse against an act of ecclesiastical Authority. To be sure, with regard to the former, the principle obtains that his private interest ought to make him diligent: but if he remains idle, let him blame himself. It is only to prevent suits, once opened, from remaining so for an indefinite time that the law establishes rather ample time limits for peremption. The state of affairs is altogether different when an administrative act, which touches the life and order of the community, is impugned.
2. Thus it is well understood how the Normae Speciales require that the general norms on processes be so adapted «that the greatest possible regard be had for that brevity which the processes to be conducted before the Second Section of the Apostolic Signatura ought to display» (art. 120), and confer upon the Cardinal Prefect as well as the Secretary the faculty of establishing «peremptory time limits» (cf. art. 102, § 2). In this process there applies also that general provision of every procedural law according to which one who refuses to receive the letter of citation is held to have been lawfully cited (in the case at hand the one making recourse deliberately made use of the system of not accepting the notifications of the Apostolic Signatura regarding the appointment of an advocate for himself and the payment of the security, aware that by such a stratagem he could prevent the decision; for which reason the recourse is declared deserted).
3. In order that a contentious-administrative recourse may be effective, it must set forth the reasons on which it rests, the laws asserted to have been violated, and the conclusions. And rightly so, since a recourse lacking these elements proves useless, because the inquiry into the illegitimacy of the decree cannot be carried out ex officio (in the case at hand the recourse itself is not complete in its essential elements; for it in no way indicates which laws have been violated in the decree of removal). |
